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Hannon: Eminent Domain in New York City

NOTE
EMINENT DOMAIN IN NEW YORK CITY
Aiden Hannon*
On the first of February, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld the condemnation and subsequent development of
several Brooklyn properties in Vanderbilt Yards that were obstructing the
construction of a new stadium for the New Jersey Nets. The rationale behind
the decision in Goldstein v. Pataki derives from the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause, which holds that “private property [shall not] be taken for
public use without just compensation.” The new construction project would
bring a National Basketball Association franchise to Brooklyn, theoretically
raising the tax revenue and creating more jobs, alongside sixteen high-rise
apartments and several office buildings. The properties were eligible for
condemnation due to repeated blight condemnations issued to them by the
City of New York. The properties could not be considered to be for the public
benefit because developer Bruce Ratner and his company Forest City Ratner
(FCR), who took the lead on the project, benefited directly from their work
and collaborated with the Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC) to
have the properties condemned. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit rejected the strong case against Ratner and other government
officials and departments involved in the Atlantic Yards project due
predominantly to one of the most notorious cases of eminent domain abuse
in recent public memory, Kelo v. The City of New London. This Note will
argue that the precedent of the Kelo and Goldstein decisions, in tandem with
weak blight standards, puts New York homeowners at risk of eminent domain
abuse.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The eminent domain takings in Goldstein v. Pataki had relevant precedent
under the Kelo ruling, which held that economic development met the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs of the case were
citizens of New London whose homes were seized by the defendant, the city
of New London, on the grounds of eminent domain to use the land to build a
Pfizer plant in the hopes that the development would economically revitalize
New London. Upholding the takings, the court ruled in favor of the defendant
in a 5 to 4 majority. This decision upended the widely accepted legal
understanding that the constitution proscribed takings for private use.1 Justice
O’Connor characterized the problem with the majority ruling in her dissent:
Today the court abandons this long-held, basic limitation on government power.
Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable
to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be
upgraded — i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way the legislature deems
more beneficial to the public – in the process.2

O’Connor’s objection applies to the Goldstein v. Pataki decision. The
Justice’s dissent accurately predicted economic takings that overwhelmingly
benefit private parties at the expense of homeowners. This prediction is
demonstrated in the non-binding aspect of eminent domain condemnations,
as seen in the disastrous outcome of the redevelopment authorized by the
Kelo case. As of 2010, all former homes were destroyed (with the exception
of one which was relocated),3 and no development occurred as Pfizer was
combating a combination of financial uncertainty amid the 2008 financial
crisis, contract disputes, and a general loss of interest due to negative
publicity resulting from the trial.4 The only substantial uses for the lot since
have been for storing storm refuse following Hurricane Irene in 2011 and as
a colony for feral cats.5 While this lot will undoubtedly be used in the future,
it is entirely plausible that a development company working with a state or
local government could use eminent domain to seize property from
homeowners only for unforeseen circumstances, financial or otherwise, to
hinder development or even prevent it entirely. In situations like the
1

See Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125, YALE L.J. F. 82 (2015).
See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). (quoting Justice O’Connor).
3
See Somin, Ilya, The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent
Domain, 233 (2015).
4
Id. at 235.
5
Id.
2
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aforementioned, former residents find themselves displaced from their
original properties, and municipalities are deprived of a planned source of
revenue.
A. The Flawed Usage of Eminent Domain
There is an extreme lack of binding terms which allows corporations to
exaggerate claims of economic benefits in order to use eminent domain to
build on properties they would not otherwise be able to access. In the similar
case of Poletown Council v. Detroit, the City of Detroit used eminent domain
to secure a significant amount of private property in the Poletown
neighborhood of Detroit to transfer to General Motors to develop a plant to
stimulate the economy.6 On March 13th of 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the defendants, citing the alleged benefits of 6,150 jobs7 as
meeting the public use requirement. The Court proceeded to state: “If the
public benefit was not so clear and significant, we would hesitate to sanction
approval of such a project.”8 However, the Court’s decision and subsequent
development would not result in the intended benefits, as the plant would
open two years late and employ 3,600 workers at the height of its operation
in the 1990s.9 This systemic flaw gives a considerable economic advantage
to corporations, which could lobby for condemnations and face no
consequences for failing to deliver a public use benefit. While the Atlantic
Yards project may deliver on the intended benefits, it is necessary to view the
project from an ex-ante perspective and anticipate future uses of eminent
domain. With precedent in cases like Goldstein, Kelo, and weak blight laws,
developers can theoretically use eminent domain to (re)develop in any part
of New York City on their terms.
II. THE ROLE OF BLIGHT
An important, yet problematic aspect of the eminent domain process is
the classification of condemned property as blighted. A blighted area,
according to The New York State Constitution, consists of “substandard and
insanitary areas.”10 Article XVIII of the New York Constitution was initially
written to address the issue of slums and other dire urban living conditions.
As Judge Fuchsberg of the New York State Court of Appeals noted in
Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris: “Historically, urban
6

See Poletown Council v. Detroit, 410 MICH. 616.
See Somin, supra note 4, at 76.
8
See Poletown Council v. Detroit, 410 MICH. 616.
9
See Somin, supra note 4, at 77.
10
See N.Y. CONST. ART. XVIII, § 1.
7
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renewal began as an effort to remove "substandard and insanitary" conditions
which threatened the health and welfare of the public, in other words
"slums,”11 whose eradication was in itself found to constitute a public
purpose for which the condemnation powers of government might
constitutionally be employed.”12 The Empire State Development Corporation
conducted a blight study of the Atlantic Yards site in 2006 which found that
the site “is characterized by blighted conditions that are unlikely to be
removed without public action”13 and that development would remedy these
conditions. There are two problems with this classification. Firstly, the
takings meet the standards of a pretextual taking, and secondly, broad blight
standards that classify average to below-average properties as equivalent to
dire conditions of urban decay allow the seizure of said properties.
III. THE KELLY TEST: DETERMINING PRETEXT
The concept of pretext arose as a limiting principle on eminent domain
takings in the case of West River Bridge Company v. Dix, wherein Justice
Woodbury questioned the legitimacy of an eminent domain taking that
benefitted a private party while satisfying a public use.14 As Justice Kennedy
clarified in his concurrence on Kelo v. New London: “A court [...] should
strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular
private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits [...].”15 While
pretextual takings are unconstitutional, as Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
demonstrates, the difficulty of determining what actions are pretextual
remains as the term pretext itself is undefined and, therefore, is up to judicial
discretion. Several standards that could be applied already exist. For instance,
Professor Daniel Kelly outlined several principles which could determine
whether a taking was pretextual or not: the magnitude of public benefits, the
extent of preparation and planning, and the identification of the private parties
who stand to benefit from the taking.16 However, despite overwhelming
evidence to suggest that these factors were present in Goldstein,17 the tests
fall short of what is necessary to determine pretext. The magnitude of public
benefits is defective as a rule because there is no determined amount of public
benefit or lack thereof, which would confirm a taking as pretextual. The
11

See id.
See Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v Morris (37 NY 2D 478, 481-482 [1975]).
13
See Atlantic Yards Arena and Redevelopment Project Blight Study, AKRF, INC. (2006).
14
See Lynn E. Blais, The Problem with Pretext, 38, FORDHAM URB. L.J. 971 (2011).
15
See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
16
See Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Governments, and
Impermissible Favoritism, 17, SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 173, 174-75, 185 (2009).
17
See Somin, Let There Be Blight: Blight Condemnations in New York After Goldstein and
Kaur, 38, FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1211 (2011).
12
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principle of the extent of preparation is irrelevant because the amount of
preparation does not determine whether a taking is pretextual – it would
merely measure the amount of time put into a project, not the intent. The
identification of private parties is necessary to determine who would benefit
from the taking, but it still fails to demonstrate whether or not the public
benefits are pretexts for the private benefit of the parties. Kelly goes on to
suggest an intent-based test, but this is equally as vague, as it is plausible that
private parties may have mixed motives.18 However, Kelly does propose a
workable framework in which eminent domain takings can be evaluated to
be pretextual or not. This framework, called the Kelly test, works in a similar
way to a workplace discrimination lawsuit, in that the condemned must
provide a direct or indirect case of favoritism with proof that a private party
involved with the development stands to benefit.19
A. The Evidence of Pretext in Goldstein
An analysis of the usage of eminent domain in Goldstein v. Pataki would
reveal that the aforementioned takings were indeed pretextual by applying
the Kelly test. Given that Ratner and FCR were the impetus behind the project
and that the ESDC’s blight report — which approved the condemnation of
properties needed to develop — was published three years after the project
was announced, indirect favoritism is not hard to prove. The fact that FCR
and Ratner stand to benefit from the transaction is absolute, as the ownership
of a stadium in a metropolitan city is extremely lucrative. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rationalized their decision to ignore
these pretextual factors by, as Professor Ilya Somin describes it:
[Refusing] to consider any evidence of improper motive, ruling that whenever a
taking is ‘rationally related to a classic public use,’ it is impermissible to ‘give close
scrutiny to the mechanics of a taking [...] as a means to gauge the purity of the
motives of various government officials who approved it.’20

This precedent of judicial abdication means that if a developer can
provide a possible public use, they can use eminent domain to secure the
property, given that it is classified as blighted for development.
B. The Normalization of Pretextual Takings

18

See Kelly, supra note 16, at 19.
Id, at 34.
20
See Somin, supra note 17, at 1214. (quoting Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. SUPP. 2D 254.).
19
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Perhaps one of the most threatening precedents to safe property
ownership is the Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris
decision, in which the Appellate Court of the State of New York noted:
Gradually, as the complexities of urban conditions became better understood, it has
become clear that the areas eligible for such renewal are not limited to ‘slums’ as
that term was formerly applied, and that, among other things, economic
underdevelopment and stagnation are also threats to the public sufficient to make
their removal cognizable as a public purpose.21

To make “economic underdevelopment” a public interest threat akin to
“slums” puts most properties at risk of eminent domain abuse; every property
can be considered “underdeveloped” to some degree. The ESDC blight
report, which deemed the Brooklyn properties in Goldstein v. Pataki as
blighted, cited “vacant lots, irregularly shaped lots, building facades that are
in ill-repair (e.g., crumbling brickwork, graffiti, flaking paint), and structures
suffering from serious physical deterioration”22 as indicators of a heavily
blighted area. A resident of Brooklyn would come to the conclusion that most
of the borough suffers from blighted conditions under the standards set by the
ESDC report. The ambiguous definition of blight combined with lenient
pretextual standards prioritize the development of property over the security
of homeownership.
IV. CONCLUSION
What can be done to remedy the lack of protection for homeowners
against development? The Appellate Court of the State of New York
endorsed legislative change in Goldstein v. Urban Development Corporation,
stating that:
Whether a matter should be the subject of a public undertaking — whether its pursuit
will serve a public purpose or use — is ordinarily the province of the Legislature,
not the Judiciary, and the actual specification of the uses identified by the
Legislature as public has been largely left to quasi-legislative administrative
agencies.23

This line of reasoning defers the judicial responsibility to lawmakers.
However, given that large private developers could lobby the legislature (in
2006, Bruce Ratner was revealed to be the third-largest spender on lobbyists
in the state of New York, spending 2.105 million dollars on lobbying

21

See Goldstein v. URBAN DEV. CORP., 921 N.E.2D 164 (2009).
See Atlantic Yards Arena and Redevelopment Project Blight Study, supra note 14.
23
See Goldstein v. URBAN DEV. CORP., 921 N.E.2D 164 (2009).
22
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expenses that year alone)24 it may be more efficient to find a different
solution. Professor Ilya Somin suggests increasing the amount of
compensation property owners receive and abolishing the current standard to
compensate homeowners with the fair market value of their property. In fact,
three members of the Supreme Court of the United States which decided on
Kelo (Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and Stephen Breyer) advocated this
position to alleviate the damages of the Kelo takings.25 Whatever the solution
is chosen, it is imperative to implement it soon, as the Goldstein precedent is
detrimental to New York homeowners.
***

24

See Kuntzman, Gersh, Ratner's Lobby Hobby: Bruce Spent Big in Albany Last Year,
BROOKLYN PAPER, 24 Mar. 2007, <www.brooklynpaper.com/ratners-lobby-hobby-brucespent-big-in-albany-last-year/>.
25
See Somin, supra note 4, at 205.
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